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INTRODUCTION: NORMATIVE LEGAL THEORY 
HAT normative theory should guide the study of law? This 
is the central question of contemporary legal theory—a 
question that crosses disciplines and approaches. The question has 
many variations. In public-law theory, the emphasis is usually on 
normative legal theories that draw on political philosophy—
libertarianism, egalitarianism, and popular sovereignty come to 
mind. In private-law theory, the emphasis has usually been on 
comprehensive moral doctrines and, in particular, on the clashes 
between fairness and welfare or between deontology and conse-
quentialism. 
W 
In this Essay I shall argue that normative legal theory should be 
shallow rather than deep. That is, I shall argue that normative 
theorizing about public and private law should eschew reliance on 
the deep premises of deontology or consequentialism and should 
instead rely on what I shall call “public values”—values that can be 
affirmed without relying on the deep and controversial premises of 
particular comprehensive moral doctrines. The argument that I ad-
vance will begin with the idea of “public reason,” the common re-
sources for deliberation and justification that are available to any 
reasonable1 citizen in a pluralist and democratic society. My central 
claim is that the ideal of public reason that is appropriate for a plu-
ralist democracy gives public values, and not deep moral theories, 
pride of place in the enterprise of normative theorizing about law. 
This idea is given definition by an ideal of public legal reason—a 
normative theory of the reasons that are appropriate for legal prac-
tice and for legal theory that aims to guide that practice. 
1 The term “reasonable” is used here in a Rawlsian sense. See John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism 48–54 (expanded ed. 2005). Rawls distinguishes between the “reasonable” 
and the “rational.” Following Rawls, I will not attempt a definition. Persons are rea-
sonable insofar as they recognize the idea of reciprocity and are willing “to propose 
principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, 
given the assurance that others will likewise do so.” Id. at 49. Someone can be rational 
in the pursuit of her own ends without being reasonable; a rational person could reject 
the idea of reciprocity. Id. at 50. 
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To give this abstract argument shape and context, I shall use a 
more particular question to illustrate and test my arguments: what 
normative legal theory is appropriate for theorizing about private 
law under the conditions that prevail in contemporary pluralist 
democracies? Although the examples that I use will be drawn 
mostly from legal discourse in the Anglophone common-law world, 
my claims are not limited to the United States and similar legal cul-
tures—they extend, in theory, to any contemporary pluralist de-
mocracy. In analyzing this particular question, I shall use the con-
temporary debate between fairness and welfare (or 
consequentialism and deontology) as my foil. That debate has re-
cently been driven by an influential and controversial series of arti-
cles by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell,2 cumulating in their book 
Fairness versus Welfare.3 Kaplow and Shavell have argued that 
normative legal theory in general, and theorizing about private law 
in particular, should be guided by welfarism—a normative theory 
associated with the discipline of economics. In addition, they claim 
that considerations of fairness should be entirely excluded from 
normative legal theory. In other words, Kaplow and Shavell argue 
for a particular form of consequentialism as the exclusive method 
for the normative evaluation of private law. In opposition to their 
claim, I shall argue that welfarism (as a comprehensive and exclu-
2 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy 
Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, 112 J. Pol. Econ. 281 (2001) [hereinafter 
Kaplow & Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any 
Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: Reply, 109 
J. Pol. Econ. 249 (2004); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict between No-
tions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle, 1 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 63 (1999); Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, 
Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. Legal Stud. 331 (2003); Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logi-
cal Consistency, 110 Yale L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of 
Fairness]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Reply to Ripstein: Notes on Welfarist ver-
sus Deontological Principles, 20 Econ. & Phil. 209 (2004); Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, All Individuals May Be Made Worse Off Under Any Nonwelfarist Principle 
(John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 350, 2002), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=304385; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Principles of 
Fairness versus Human Welfare: On the Evaluation of Legal Policy (John M. Olin 
Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 277, 2000), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=224946.  
3 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (2002); see also Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961 (2001) 
[hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (article)]. 
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sionary moral doctrine) has no legitimate place in normative legal 
theory because it is inconsistent with the requirements of public 
reason and hence with the legitimacy of private law. The argument 
that I make will also imply that an exclusive emphasis on the deep 
premises of deontological moral theory is also inappropriate. Re-
duced to a slogan, my claim could be put as follows: both fairness 
and consequences, but neither welfarism nor deontology. 
My discussion of welfarism in general, and Kaplow and Shavell 
in particular, will focus both on the general relationship between 
welfarism and public reason and on the particular claims that Kap-
low and Shavell make on behalf of welfarism. One of these 
claims—that any nonwelfarist methodology can result in the coun-
terintuitive conclusion that a possible world that makes everyone 
worse off is better than one that makes everyone better off—
provides the occasion for an extended discussion of the conceptual 
heart of welfarism as the exclusive method for the evaluation of le-
gal policies. 
In the remainder of this Introduction, I introduce the conceptual 
vocabulary that grounds the rest of the Essay and, in particular, 
five concepts: welfarism, consequentialism, fairness, deontology, 
and public reason. The aim is to give a preliminary definition of 
these ideas that will both clarify and adumbrate the more detailed 
arguments that follow. 
Welfarism is the view that policies (or, strictly speaking, the 
states of affairs that policies produce) should be assessed solely by 
a social-welfare function that considers only information about in-
dividual preferences. Welfarism can be combined with another 
idea, consequentialism, the view that actions should be evaluated 
solely on the basis of their consequences (the states of affairs which 
the actions produce). Kaplow and Shavell’s thesis is that assess-
ment or evaluation of legal policies should be based solely and ex-
clusively on the consequences of legal policies for the satisfaction 
of preferences from an impartial or anonymous point of view. For 
them, fairness and other rival moral values simply have no role to 
play in the normative evaluation of the law. 
Fairness is the idea that policies (and not, strictly speaking, the 
states of affairs that policies produce) can be assessed in part by 
the criteria of corrective and distributive justice. In contrast to wel-
farism, fairness is inconsistent with consequentialism because the 
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justice or injustice of a policy is not solely a function of the conse-
quences that the policy produces. The idea of fairness may be 
grounded in deontology—an approach (or family of approaches) to 
moral philosophy. Deontological theories maintain that the right-
ness or wrongness of actions is not reducible to the value of the 
states of affairs that they produce. Rather, an action may be wrong-
ful because it violates rights, even if the action produces good con-
sequences. 
Public reason, for the purposes of this Essay, is the common or 
shared reason of citizens in a pluralist and democratic society. An 
ideal of public reason provides a normative standard for assessment 
of the kinds of reasons offered in public, political, and legal con-
texts. Here, I shall be dealing with a subset of public reason (legal 
reason) and a subset of the ideal of public reason (an ideal of legal 
reason), a normative standard for the practice of justification by 
lawyers, judges, and other officials. 
The significance of the fairness-versus-welfare debate for the 
practice of normative legal theory can hardly be overstated. For 
example, Kaplow and Shavell claim that there is only one reason-
able approach to normative legal scholarship, and that approach is 
welfarism. The obvious implication is that other normative theories 
should be set aside. Legal scholars working in the traditions of cor-
rective justice, critical legal studies, critical race theory, feminist ju-
risprudence, neoformalism, liberal political theory, libertarianism, 
and virtue jurisprudence are in serious need of reeducation. Even 
utilitarians who do not identify utility with preferences are seri-
ously misguided. If Kaplow and Shavell’s arguments are correct, 
then most of the legal academy should confess error, repudiate 
their prior normative work, and prepare for a brave new world. 
But Kaplow and Shavell are not unique in their totalitarian am-
bitions. There are other legal theories that make similar claims. 
Ronald Dworkin, for example, has argued that consequentialism 
(or policy, as he puts it) has no place in judicial reasoning.4 Of 
course, every legal theory worth its salt claims to be true or correct 
4 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, in Taking Rights Seriously 81, 84 (1977); Ronald 
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1060 (1975). 
SOLUM_BOOK 10/22/2006 3:51 PM 
1454 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 92:1449 
 
in some sense,5 but many theories admit of a reasonable pluralism 
of theoretical perspectives.6 That is, many normative theories of 
law acknowledge that at least some competing theories could be af-
firmed by reasonable persons; for some normative theories, the 
fact of reasonable pluralism is one of the features of the world that 
has important normative consequences.7 Many theorists view their 
own theory as the best member of the set of reasonable theories 
and believe that diverse theoretical perspectives can share common 
principles. However, because Kaplow and Shavell’s argument 
claims that their opponents are committed to contradictory beliefs, 
it implies that competing theories are not only wrong but also un-
reasonable, irrational, or inconsistent. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I will situate the fairness-
versus-welfare debate by placing welfare economics in the context 
of moral and political philosophy and contemporary legal theory. 
Part II will articulate and argue for an ideal of public legal reason. 
Part III will put welfarism at the bar of public legal reason and find 
it wanting. The Essay will conclude that arguments of policy and 
principle both have roles to play in public legal reason. 
Since the argument of this Essay is long and complex, a few ad-
ditional words of introduction may be of assistance to the reader. 
This Essay will advance two central theses. The first thesis, the fo-
cus of Part II, is that a particular ideal of “public legal reason” is 
supported by considerations of political morality and legal theory. 
The second thesis, the focus of Part III, is that the version of welfa-
rism advocated by Kaplow and Shavell does not meet the require-
ments of public legal reason. In the course of advancing the second 
thesis, this Essay will take an in-depth look at Kaplow and Shav-
ell’s claim that any nonwelfarist theory of policy evaluation violates 
the requirements of weak Pareto. Given the two theses, this Essay 
will then reach its final conclusions. The practice of legal justifica-
5 This claim may be exaggerated. Some postmodern views of the world may not 
claim to be true or correct. Such theories may be illuminating, revealing, or edifying. 
See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 11–12 (2d prtg. 1980). 
6 The idea of reasonable pluralism is closely related to John Rawls’s views. See 
Rawls, supra note 1, at 441. A similar perspective is found in Cass Sunstein’s notion of 
an incompletely theorized agreement. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Po-
litical Conflict 8 (1996). 
7 For example, in justice as fairness, the fact of reasonable pluralism plays a central 
role. See Rawls, supra note 1, at 489. 
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tion should limit itself to values that are accessible to reasonable 
citizens. This means that law’s deliberations should be shallow, not 
deep. 
I. SITUATING THE FAIRNESS-VERSUS-WELFARE DEBATE 
The fairness-versus-welfare debate will make more sense if 
placed in context by (1) considering welfarism in the history of 
economic thought in general and welfare economics in particular, 
(2) situating welfarism and fairness on the map of moral and politi-
cal philosophy, and (3) exploring the relationship between fairness 
and welfare to the topography of normative legal theory. 
A. Welfare Economics 
The fairness-versus-welfare debate reflects the importance of the 
law and economics movement in the legal academy. Legal econom-
ics, like economics generally, has a descriptive (or positive) and a 
prescriptive (or normative) branch. Descriptive economics seeks to 
predict and explain economic behavior, and descriptive legal eco-
nomics typically seeks to predict and explain economic behavior as 
it is affected by legal rules. Normative economics is concerned with 
the evaluation of economic behaviors and government policies, 
while normative law and economics is concerned with the evalua-
tion of legal rules.  In Fairness versus Welfare, Kaplow and Shavell 
practice both descriptive and normative economics, but welfarism 
is self-avowedly a normative theory. 
There are several plausible formulations of normative econom-
ics, but almost all of normative economics begins with the funda-
mental idea of utility as a conception or measure of the good. 
Economists may disagree about the nature of utility, the relation-
ship of utility to social welfare, and the role of welfare in public 
policy, but most (if not all) economists would assent to the abstract 
proposition that, ceteris paribus, more utility is a good thing. 
Beyond such very general agreements, there are a host of dis-
agreements within economic theory. One key divide is between 
cardinal and ordinal interpretations of utility. An ordinal utility 
function for an individual consists of a rank ordering of possible 
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states of affairs (possible worlds) for that individual.8 An ordinal 
function indicates that individual i prefers possible world X to pos-
sible world Y, but it does not indicate whether X is much better or 
only a little better than Y.9 A cardinal utility function yields a real-
number value for each possible world. Assuming that utility func-
tions yield values expressed in utiles (units of utility), then individ-
ual i’s utility function might score possible world P at 80 utiles and 
possible world Q at 120 utiles. One can represent the utility func-
tion U of individual i for P and Q as follows: 
Ui(P) = 80 utiles 
Ui(Q) = 120 utiles 
The distinction between cardinal and ordinal utilities is poten-
tially important for utilitarianism, at least on certain interpreta-
tions. As a theory of evaluation, utilitarianism is the view that an 
action is the best action if and only if the action maximizes utility 
when compared with all possible alternative actions.10 For technical 
reasons, utilitarianism requires both cardinality and full interper-
sonal comparability.11 This point about utilitarianism is closely re-
lated to the history of welfare economics,12 the explicitly normative 
branch of economic theory. 
Both cardinality and interpersonal comparability pose measure-
ment problems for economists. Even in the case of a single individ-
ual, it is difficult to measure cardinal utilities reliably. Measure-
8 For the most part, I shall use the philosophical locution “possible world” rather 
than the economists’ phrase “state of affairs” for the remainder of this Essay. 
9 Economists sometimes talk about the utility of consumption of goods or services as 
opposed to the utility of states of affairs. Talk about the utility of consumption or of 
goods is shorthand for talk about states of affairs or possible worlds. When an econo-
mist says “Ben would receive a utility of 100 by consuming a widget,” that statement 
can be translated into “Ben’s utility index for a possible world in which Ben receives a 
widget would be 100 points higher than Ben’s utility index for a possible world that is 
identical in all respects except Ben’s consumption of the widget.” 
10 See John A. Weymark, A reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen debate on utilitari-
anism, in Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being 255, 299 (Jon Elster & John E. 
Rohmer eds., 1991) (“Utilitarian theories evaluate the relative desirability of social 
alternatives in terms of a weighted sum of the utilities obtained by each person in so-
ciety from the alternatives being considered.”). 
11 Id. at 303. The intuitive idea follows from the notion that utilitarianism requires 
maximization of utility across persons, “the greatest good for the greatest number.” 
Maximization across persons requires interpersonal comparability. Maximization 
across persons requires cardinality. 
12 See Robin Boadway & Neil Bruce, Welfare Economics 1, 5–6 (1984). 
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ments that support interpersonal comparisons are even more diffi-
cult to justify, and cardinal interpersonal comparisons seem to re-
quire a variety of controversial value judgments. Market prices 
cannot serve as a proxy for utility for a variety of reasons, including 
wealth effects.13 The challenge for welfare economists is to develop 
a methodology that yields robust evaluations but does not require 
cardinal interpersonally comparable utilities. 
This is the point at which the Pareto principles arrive on the 
scene. Suppose that all the information available about individual 
utilities is ordinal and not interpersonally comparable. In other 
words, each individual can rank order possible worlds, but analysts 
or policymakers cannot compare the rank orderings across per-
sons.14 The weak Pareto principle suggests that possible world P is 
socially preferable to possible world Q if everyone’s ordinal rank-
ing of P is higher than his ranking of Q. Weak Pareto does not go 
very far because such unanimity of preferences among all persons 
is rare. The strong Pareto principle suggests that possible world P 
is socially preferable to possible world Q if at least one person 
ranks P higher than Q and no one ranks P lower than Q. Unlike 
weak Pareto, strong Pareto does permit some relatively robust 
conclusions. 
The so-called new welfare economics was based on the insight 
that market transactions without externalities satisfy strong Pareto. 
If the only difference between world P and world Q is that in P, in-
dividuals i1 and i2 engage in an exchange (money for widgets, 
chickens for shoes) where both prefer the result of the exchange, 
then the exchange is Pareto efficient—and hence satisfies the 
strong Pareto principle. A possible world where no further Pareto-
efficient moves (or trades) are possible is called Pareto optimal. 
The assumption about externalities is, of course, crucial. If there 
13 See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness 
to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 59, 85–87 (1993). 
14 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 9 (2d ed. 1963). For 
legal applications, see, for example, David Luban, Social Choice Theory as Jurispru-
dence, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 521 (1996); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Lost in 
Translation: Social Choice Theory Is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent, 14 J. 
Contemp. Legal Issues 585 (2005); William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective 
Choice: Arrow’s Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 1986 Duke L.J. 948. 
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are negative externalities of any sort, then the trade is not Pareto 
efficient.15
Strong Pareto plus ordinal utility information allows some possi-
ble worlds to be ranked on the basis of everyone’s preferences. A 
method for transforming individual utility information into such a 
social ranking is called a social-utility function. Kenneth Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem demonstrates that it is impossible to con-
struct a social-utility function that can transform individual ordinal 
rankings into a social ranking in cases not covered by strong Pareto 
if certain plausible assumptions are made.16 Arrow’s theorem has 
spurred two lines of development in welfare economics. One line 
of development relaxes various assumptions that Arrow made, for 
example, Arrow’s assumption that the social ranking must be tran-
sitive (if X is preferred to Y, and Y is preferred to Z, then X must 
be preferred to Z). The other line of development considers the 
possibility of allowing information other than individual, noncom-
parable ordinal utilities. 
Suppose that full interpersonal comparability and cardinal utility 
information are allowed. This is sufficient to support what are 
called Bergson-Samuelson utility functions,17 which have the form 
 
W(x) = F(U1(x), U2(x), . . . UN(x)) 
 
where W(x) represents a real number social utility value for some 
possible world X; F is some increasing function that yields a real 
number; U1(x) is a cardinal, interpersonally comparable utility 
value yielded by some procedure for individual 1 for possible world 
X; and N is the total number of individuals.18
15 This problem can be ameliorated, however, by considering the possibility of a side 
payment that would compensate the party injured by the externality. Transaction 
costs may prevent such side payments; the costs of compensating the injured property 
may consume more than the surplus value created by transaction. Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency addresses this problem by making an additional assumption about what is so-
cially preferable. One could postulate that state X is socially preferable to state Y if 
zero-transaction-cost side payments were made from those who prefer X to Y to those 
who prefer Y to X, which would make the recipients indifferent between the states. 
16 See Arrow, supra note 14; see also Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, 
Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy 167–69 (1996). 
17 Boadway & Bruce, supra note 12, at 17. 
18 Id. at 139. 
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There are a variety of different possible functions that can be 
substituted for F. For example, one could substitute summation (∑) 
for F and simply add the individual utility values. This is sometimes 
called a Benthamite or classical utilitarian social-welfare function 
and is famously associated with Jeremy Bentham. The classical 
utilitarian social-welfare function can be represented as follows: 
 
∑
=
=
H
h
hu
1
 W  
In the alternative, one could substitute the product function (∏) 
and multiply individual utilities. This is sometimes called a Ber-
noulli-Nash social-welfare function, which can be represented as 
follows: 
∏
=
=
H
h
hu
1
 W 
 
The Bernoulli-Nash social-welfare function has an important 
technical advantage over the classical utilitarian function because 
the former requires only information about the relative strength of 
individual preferences, whereas the latter requires information on 
some absolute scale.  Bernoulli-Nash differs from the classical util-
ity function in another important respect—it strongly favors equal-
ity (minimization of deviation) among individual utility values.  
There are a variety of other possible social-welfare functions, some 
of which will be discussed in greater detail below. 
Welfarism is an important component of Kaplow and Shavell’s 
theory. Welfarism is lucidly defined by Professor Amartya Sen, 
who states: 
“[W]elfarism[]” . . . insists that states of affairs must be judged 
exclusively by the utility information (such as happiness or desire 
fulfillment) related to the respective states—no matter what the 
other features of the consequent state of affairs may be, such as 
the performance of particular acts (however nasty), or the viola-
tion of other people’s liberties (however personal).19  
19 Amartya Sen, Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason, 97 J. Phil. 477, 
478–79 (2000); see also Boadway & Bruce, supra note 12, at 8. 
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Sen’s definition gives us a good sense of the general concept of 
welfare, but welfarism as advocated by Kaplow and Shavell repre-
sents a very particular approach to welfare economics. Their ver-
sion of welfarism departs from the main line of development of the 
new welfare economics because they assume that cardinal and 
interpersonally comparable utility information is available. That is, 
Kaplow and Shavell’s version of welfarism is committed to a Berg-
son-Samuelson social-welfare function. On the other hand, welfa-
rism is not equivalent to a particular form of that function. In par-
ticular, welfarism is not committed to classical utilitarianism, 
although most welfarists (including Kaplow and Shavell) espouse 
the idea that a social-welfare function must be an increasing func-
tion of individual utilities. 
B. Moral and Political Philosophy 
This Section takes a step back and approaches the fairness-
versus-welfare debate from another angle—by situating the debate 
within the discourse of moral and political philosophy. Normative 
economics is related to moral and political philosophy in a variety 
of ways. An economist might take the position that individual per-
sons should act so as to maximize their expected utilities. Norma-
tive rational-choice theory would seem to be a moral or ethical the-
ory, one that philosophers might see as a species of ethical egoism. 
A welfare economist might advocate a classical utilitarian social-
welfare function. To the moral and political philosopher, this 
would appear to be a form of classical utilitarianism. Thus, viewed 
from one angle, normative economics simply is applied moral and 
political philosophy, and theories of welfare are moral and political 
theories. 
There is, however, another way of viewing the relationship be-
tween normative economics and moral philosophy. Economists see 
themselves as social scientists. Given a crude picture of the fact-
value distinction, normative economics might be seen as unscien-
tific. Even weak Pareto involves a value judgment, and economists 
may believe that this value judgment can neither be proved nor 
disproved. Economists may see such value judgments as subjective 
rather than objective. This way of looking at normative judgments 
may stem from a philosophical theory such as noncognitivist 
metaethics, the view that moral propositions are neither true nor 
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false. Crudely put, noncognitivists might believe that moral judg-
ments are simply expressions of approval and disapproval. The re-
ductio ad absurdum of noncognitivism is the famous boo-hooray 
theory, which reduces the meaning of “X is good” to “hooray X” 
and “X is bad” to “boo X.”20 Although noncognitivism is itself 
highly controversial in moral philosophy, it seems less controversial 
(and perhaps even unquestioned or unexamined) in economics. 
Whatever the source of economists’ aversion to value judgments, 
much of the history of welfare economics can be seen as involving 
value parsimony, or efforts to get the maximum prescriptive con-
tent from the “weakest” (meaning “least controversial”) normative 
assumptions. Hence, the new welfare economists tried to operate 
on the basis of one normative assumption, strong Pareto. From 
their point of view, strong Pareto appears to be uncontroversial. 
Even if it cannot be proven, some economists may believe that it is 
so intuitively plausible and widely shared that it is an appropriate 
point of departure. 
Moral and political philosophy does not share the value parsi-
mony of normative economics. In particular, noncognitivism is 
highly controversial within the philosophical discipline of metaeth-
ics. Although there may have been a time when noncognitivist 
metaethical theories were dominant, that time has now passed. Al-
though it might be controversial to assert that the cognitivist ap-
proaches now dominate, it is surely not controversial to assert that 
many philosophers now believe that moral propositions are objec-
tive, bear truth values, and can be proven or disproven (or can be 
shown to be better or worse). In addition, as noted below, weak 
Pareto itself is not an uncontroversial normative assumption from 
the point of view of moral philosophy. 
From the standpoint of moral and political philosophy, welfa-
rism is just one of a whole family of consequentialist moral theo-
ries. Because of the important historical role that classical utilitari-
anism has played in moral philosophy, some philosophers and legal 
theorists may assume that welfarism is merely a version of act-
20 See Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic 102–20 (1952); see also Lawrence 
Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 041: Metaethics (June 20, 2004), 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/06/legal_theory_le.html. 
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utilitarianism,21 but this is not actually the case for multiple reasons. 
First, welfarism is only a theory about the evaluation of possible 
worlds; it is not directly a theory about the evaluation of actions. 
Act-utilitarianism is, however, a theory about the rightness and 
wrongness of actions. Second, welfarism is only committed to the 
idea that social welfare is an increasing function of individual utili-
ties, whereas act-utilitarianism is usually thought to be committed 
to either summation or average (mean) as the relevant function. I 
could go on, but the point is clear—welfarism should not be con-
flated with act-utilitarianism. 
Another important philosophical question concerns the nature 
of utility. Welfarism is committed to a view that is close to what 
moral philosophers might call the preference-satisfaction concep-
tion of utility, but there are other conceptions as well. Bentham 
had a hedonistic conception of utility—utility consists of pleasures 
and the absence of pain. One might also have a eudaimonistic con-
ception of utility; that is, utility might consist of happiness, under-
stood as a quality that is not reducible to any subjective state, such 
as pleasure, but is instead an objective condition of human life, 
such as flourishing. 
Contemporary moral philosophy is not limited to consequential-
ism. What I am about to say is controversial, but I think it is accu-
rate. Within contemporary moral philosophy, utilitarianism is gen-
erally thought to have severe problems. To my knowledge, 
welfarism in the form that has entered contemporary debates 
about normative legal theory has no champion in moral philoso-
phy, although it is surely possible that someone does hold a posi-
tion that is close to welfarism. There are consequentialists in con-
temporary moral philosophy and there are utilitarians of various 
forms, but these theories are controversial and contested. 
What are the alternatives to consequentialism in contemporary 
moral philosophy? Answering that question in a single paragraph 
with a simple system of classification is bound to be misleading, but 
21 Act-utilitarianism is the theory that holds that an action is right if and only if the 
action produces the best consequences (the most utility) as compared to any other 
alternative action that could be performed. See David Braybrooke, Utilitarianism: 
Restoration; Repairs; Renovations 11 (2004); see also Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory 
Lexicon 008: Utilitarianism (Nov. 2, 2003), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_ 
lexicon/2003/11/legal_theory_le_4.html. 
SOLUM_BOOK 10/22/2006 3:51 PM 
2006] Public Legal Reason 1463 
 
there is no other way to proceed. One way of dividing the pie is to 
classify moral theories as being (1) consequentialist, (2) deonto-
logical, or (3) aretaic. Deontological moral theories, as noted 
above, hold that the rightness or wrongness of actions is not exclu-
sively a function of the consequences they produce but also results 
from their fairness or unfairness. Some deontological theories ex-
clude consequentialist reasons altogether; on some interpretations, 
Kant’s theory does this. Other deontological moral theories allow 
for the consideration of consequences in some circumstances but 
maintain that considerations of fairness trump good consequences 
in other circumstances. 
In addition to consequentialist and deontological views, some 
moral theories are aretaic. The word “aretaic” comes from the 
Greek word “arete,” which can be translated as virtue or excel-
lence. Aristotle’s moral views are sometimes classified as aretaic, as 
are the contemporary theories that are called “virtue ethics.” Vir-
tue-centered theories typically deny that there is a master algo-
rithm or decision procedure for ethics. Instead, they focus on char-
acter—on what it means to be an excellent or virtuous person. 
Typically, an aretaic moral theory will include an account of the 
human excellences or virtues.22
So far, I have been dealing with moral philosophy, but the rele-
vant landscape includes political philosophy as well. I begin by dis-
cussing the relationship between moral and political philosophy. 
One approach to that relationship would emphasize dependence 
and reduction. That is, one might think that political philosophy 
must be grounded on and ultimately reducible to moral philoso-
phy. On this view of the relationship, political theories are ulti-
mately consequentialist, deontological, or aretaic. This does not 
mean that political philosophies would not have distinctive content. 
After all, there are many different approaches to the organization 
of society that could be given consequentialist foundations. One 
can imagine consequentialist foundations for either deliberative 
democracy or for a minimalist night-watchman state. The other 
approach to the relationship between political and moral philoso-
22 See generally Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics 25–42 (1999); Rosalind 
Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/. 
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phy would emphasize the independence of political philosophy 
from moral theory. This idea is thematized in the later work of 
John Rawls, especially Political Liberalism23 and associated essays. 
There are a variety of positions in contemporary normative politi-
cal theory, including Rawls’s theory, justice as fairness, libertarian 
theories, egalitarian theories, democratic theories, and civic repub-
lican theories. 
C. The State of the Normative Legal Theory 
Legal theory is hardly a monolith, but most of it either describes 
the law, evaluates the law, or does both. Normative legal theory, in 
turn, comes in a variety of flavors. Legal formalism is strongly as-
sociated with doctrinal scholarship, which evaluates particular doc-
trines or decisions based on a criterion of coherence with the legal 
topography. For example, a judicial decision might be criticized on 
the ground that it is inconsistent with prior decisions or the deci-
sions of a court that ranks higher in the hierarchy of authority. In 
addition to legal formalism, there are a variety of normative theo-
ries that look outside the law for normative guidance. Attempting 
to categorize normative legal theories and then to generalize about 
them is fraught with peril, but with this caveat in mind, the follow-
ing categories are useful as a heuristic: 
(1) Critical theories of law, including feminist jurisprudence, 
critical race theory, and critical legal studies, expose the indeter-
minacies and bias of other approaches but frequently refrain 
from making explicit normative recommendations; 
(2) Liberal legal theories, including law as integrity, legal ver-
sions of justice as fairness, and libertarian approaches to law, 
emphasize considerations of fairness and the importance of 
rights; 
(3) Normative law and economics emphasizes the value of effi-
ciency and may be grounded in utilitarianism or pragmatism; 
23 Rawls, supra note 1. 
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(4) Practical-reason and virtue-jurisprudence approaches empha-
size the role of practical judgment in legal decisionmaking and 
may consider the role of law in shaping character; 
(5) Republican, deliberative-democracy, and discourse ap-
proaches emphasize the value of reaching political decisions 
through just processes; and 
(6) Pragmatism or legal pragmatism eschews unifying normative 
theories and emphasizes practical judgments about particular 
cases. 
One can slice and dice the normative legal theory pie in various 
ways. For example, critical theorists want to emphasize the affini-
ties of liberalism with law and economics. For the purposes of this 
Essay, the point of these rough-and-ready classifications is simply 
to situate welfarism in general, and Kaplow and Shavell’s version 
in particular, in the context of the plurality of approaches to nor-
mative legal theory. 
II. PUBLIC LEGAL REASON 
The central claim of this Essay is two-sided. On its face, the cen-
tral claim is positive and general: normative legal theory should 
employ the resources of “public legal reason,” understood as legal 
reasons that are accessible by all reasonable citizens. The flip side 
of that claim is negative and more specific: Kaplow and Shavell are 
wrong, and welfarism should not be the exclusive normative ap-
proach to the evaluation of legal policies. Indeed, Kaplow and 
Shavell’s version of welfarism—to the extent that it claims exclusiv-
ity—does not provide judges or legal scholars with an appropriate 
basis for reasoning. 
A. The Idea of Public Reason 
“Public reason” is the common reason of a political society; it is 
the shared capacity of citizens to engage in political deliberation. 
An ideal of public reason provides a systematic answer to the fol-
lowing question: what limits does political morality impose on pub-
lic political debate and discussion by the citizens of a modern plu-
ralist democracy? This question has given rise to a substantial 
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debate, one that primarily has played out among political philoso-
phers, legal theorists,24 and theologians. For example, some have 
argued that reliance on religious reasons should be restricted in 
public debate and deliberation about public policy.25 Still others 
contend that in public debate, an ideal of political morality should 
mirror the freedom of expression: all viewpoints should contend in 
a marketplace of ideas. Because legal institutions such as courts 
and legislatures make use of public reason, it is not surprising that 
the idea of public reason has stirred much interest among philoso-
phers of law and legal theorists. 
Contemporary debates about public reason have tended to focus 
on the content of the principle (or set of principles) that should 
serve as an ideal of public reason. This disagreement occurs be-
cause one can conceive of different principles by which an ideal can 
express the requirement that reason be public. Laying out these 
principles provides a structure for analyzing the public-reason de-
bate. The structure of the debate can be illuminated by considering 
three alternative principles that can be used to give content to an 
ideal of public reason: (1) a principle of laissez-faire, (2) a principle 
of exclusion, and (3) a principle of inclusion. 
Each of the three principles needs brief explication. First, a prin-
ciple of laissez-faire interprets the idea of public reason as reason 
that is free of constraint, with the corollary that all reasons are pub-
lic reasons. Second, a principle of exclusion rules out the use of at 
least some sorts of nonpublic reasons in at least some situations. 
For example, an ideal of public reason that excluded all nonpublic 
reasons from all political discourse would employ a simple princi-
ple of exclusion. Third, a principle of inclusion requires the use of 
at least some sorts of public reasons in at least some situations. For 
example, an ideal of public reason that required participants in 
24 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons 39–50 (1995). 
25 See, e.g., Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason 169–80 (2000). 
For other recent discussion of this question, see Rick Garnett, More on Justice Tho-
mas, Public Reason, and Natural Law (Dec. 16, 2004), http://www.mirrorof 
justice.com/mirrorofjustice/2004/12/more_on_justice.html; Lawrence B. Solum, Natu-
ral Law, Public Reason, and the Constitution (Dec. 15, 2004), 
http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/2004_12_01_lsolum_archive.html#1103128654100
52268; Lawrence B. Solum, Steve Smith Has Questions About Justice Thomas & 
Natural Law with an Updated Post Script (Dec. 16, 2004), http://lsolum. 
blogspot.com/archives/2004_12_01_lsolum_archive.html#110321991307216361.   
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public political debates to offer a sincerely held public reason for 
each position advanced would deploy a principle of inclusion. 
The three basic principles can be combined in various ways to 
produce a complex ideal of public reason. A principle of exclusion 
might apply to public officials, but a principle of laissez-faire might 
apply to ordinary citizens. Different principles might apply to pub-
lic debate over the constitutional essentials than to ordinary legisla-
tion, adjudication, or executive action. One set of principles might 
apply to public justifications and a different set to private delibera-
tions. 
Sometimes it seems that the public-reason debate is a contest be-
tween a simple principle of laissez-faire, advocated by those whose 
aim is to formulate an ideal of public reason that makes room for 
deep moral or religious justifications for public policy, and a simple 
principle of exclusion, advocated by those who wish to keep relig-
ion or morality out of politics. As explained below, this view of the 
debate is far too simple. Positions that at first blush appear to be 
simple principles of laissez-faire turn out to be complex principles 
with elements of both laissez-faire and exclusion. Positions that 
have been interpreted as rigorous principles of exclusion turn out 
to be more accurately characterized as principles of inclusion. 
B. Rawlsian Public Reason 
Although the idea of public reason can be found26 in Hobbes,27 
Rousseau,28 and Kant,29 it was John Rawls who brought this idea 
into play in contemporary political philosophy. In sum, Rawls’s 
idea of public reason is marked by three features. First, Rawls un-
derstands public reason as the common reason of a political soci-
ety. A society’s reason is its “way of formulating its plans, of put-
ting its ends in an order of priority and of making its decisions 
accordingly.”30 Public reason contrasts with the “nonpublic reasons 
26 See Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 San Diego L. 
Rev. 729, 754–62 (1993). 
27 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 306 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1660). 
28 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy, in Basic Political Writ-
ings 111, 113 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., 1987).  
29 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in Politi-
cal Writings 54, 55 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d enlarged ed. 1991). 
30 Rawls, supra note 1, at 212. 
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of churches and universities and of many other associations in civil 
society.”31 Both public and nonpublic reason share features that are 
essential to reason itself, such as simple rules of inference and evi-
dence.32 Public reasons, however, are limited to premises and 
modes of reasoning that are accessible to the public at large. Rawls 
argues that these include “presently accepted general beliefs and 
forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and 
conclusions of science when these are not controversial.”33 By con-
trast, the nonpublic reason of a church might include premises 
about the authority of sacred texts and modes of reasoning that 
appeal to the interpretive authority of particular persons. Nonpub-
lic reasons are not, however, limited to religious reasons. The deep 
and controversial premises of any comprehensive moral concep-
tion, such as utilitarianism or Kantian deontological ethics, are also 
nonpublic reasons. 
Second, Rawls formulates a particular ideal of public reason—a 
standard for judging the appropriateness of the reasoning of citi-
zens and officials. Rawls’s discussion is limited to “the constitu-
tional essentials”34 and “questions of basic justice.”35 Thus, the 
scope of the freedom of speech and qualifications for the franchise 
would be subject to the Rawlsian ideal, but he does not resolve the 
question whether it would also apply to the details of tax legislation 
and the regulation of pollution control.36
Third, Rawls’s ideal of public reason applies to citizens and pub-
lic officials when they engage in political advocacy in a public fo-
rum; it also governs the decisions that officials make and the votes 
that citizens cast in elections. The ideal does not apply to personal 
31 Id. at 213. 
32 Id. at 220. 
33 Id. at 224. 
34 The constitutional essentials are simply the basic provisions of the constitution: 
the structural provisions that determine legislative, executive, and judicial power and 
the rights-conferring provisions that ensure basic constitutional rights such as the right 
to vote, liberty of conscience, freedoms of speech and religion, and the right to due 
process. See id. at 227. 
35 Questions of basic justice include the scope of essential liberties, such as freedom 
of conscience and expression, as well as core commitments to fairness in the distribu-
tion of wealth, income, and other primary goods. Id. at 214, 227–30. 
36 Rawls notes that a full account of public reason would need to offer an account of 
these subjects and how they differ from the constitutional essentials and questions of 
basic justice. See id. at 214–15. 
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reflection and deliberation about political questions;37 by implica-
tion, it could not apply to such reflection or deliberation about 
questions that are not political in nature. 
Rawls’s case for an ideal of public reason rests on a factual 
premise. Rawls argues that given free institutions, one cannot ex-
pect agreement on fundamental questions of morality and religion. 
Moreover, the pluralism that characterizes modern democratic so-
cieties is not a transitory phenomenon; since the Wars of Religion, 
it has been apparent that agreement on a single comprehensive 
moral or religious conception of the good cannot be reached with-
out unacceptable use of coercive state power. Given this fact, 
which can be called the fact of pluralism, Rawls argues that one 
should adhere to what he calls the liberal principle of legitimacy. 
That principle states: “Our exercise of political power is proper and 
hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a con-
stitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be ex-
pected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
them as reasonable and rational.”38 It is because of this principle 
that “the ideal of citizenship imposes . . . the duty of civility—to be 
able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how 
the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be sup-
ported by the political values of public reason.”39 The duty of civil-
ity implies that the fundamental content of Rawls’s ideal of public 
reason is a principle of inclusion: civility requires that political jus-
tification include public reasons, because public reasons can be ac-
cepted by our fellow citizens as reasonable and rational. 
C. Is the Exclusion of Deep Premises Justified? 
The full debate over the best ideal of public reason for a modern 
democratic society must include a comparison of various principles 
of laissez-faire, inclusion, and exclusion in a variety of contexts.40 
An illustration of that debate is the controversy over the question 
whether an ideal of public reason should incorporate any principle 
of exclusion. 
37 Id. at 215. 
38 Id. at 217. 
39 Id. 
40 See Solum, supra note 26, at 741–51. 
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A relatively easy case is posed by the question of whether citi-
zens should refrain from the giving of religious reasons in public 
political debate. Although some may disagree, there is a strong 
case against this exclusion on the grounds that it is unfair to reli-
gious believers. Why should religious believers accept as legitimate 
an ideal of public reason that allows adherents of secular moral 
views to advance their comprehensive moral doctrines, even when 
they are not part of the public political culture, but prohibits be-
lievers from doing so? Rawls’s wide ideal of public reason does not 
suffer from this sort of unfairness because it treats all comprehen-
sive doctrines, whether religious or secular, equally: utilitarianism, 
Kantianism, and Catholicism stand on the same footing because 
each articulates deep and comprehensive views about the nature of 
the good. 
In the context of the fairness-versus-welfare debate, the same 
charge of unfairness that is made by religious believers might be 
made by welfarists or deontologists. They might argue that the ex-
clusion of the deep premises of their theories is unfair. The answer 
that could be given to them is the same as the answer that could be 
given to believers. An ideal of public reason treats the deep prem-
ises of all comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines 
equally. 
Consider another argument against principles of exclusion, ad-
vanced by Jeremy Waldron: 
What [Rawls’s] conception seems to rule out is the novel or dis-
concerting move in political argumentation: the premise that no 
one has ever thought of before, but which, once stated, sounds 
plausible or interesting. Rawls’ conception seems to assume an 
inherent limit in the human capacity for imagination and creativ-
ity in politics, implying as it does that something counts as a le-
gitimate move in public reasoning only to the extent that it 
latches onto existing premises that everybody already shares.41
Waldron’s claim is too strong. If public reason required universal 
agreement on premises, then public political debate would be im-
possible.42 Even an ideal of public reason that excluded all nonpub-
41 Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 San Diego L. 
Rev. 817, 838 (1993). 
42 See Solum, supra note 26, at 743. 
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lic reasons would allow for premises that are not already shared. 
To take an obvious example, this exclusionary principle would al-
low factual premises that are accessible to common science or or-
dinary science, even though these are not premises that everybody 
already shares. Moreover, no violation of this principle of exclusion 
would occur if a citizen used shared political values and factual ar-
guments supported by common sense or ordinary science to argue 
for a new principle of political morality. Something similar has oc-
curred over the course of the last century or so with respect to the 
right to privacy, a principle of political morality that is, at least in 
some sense, new. Thus, Waldron’s argument applies only to a very 
special category of novel political arguments—those that cannot 
themselves be supported by considerations of public reason. 
The force of Waldron’s point is further blunted by the fact that 
the wide ideal of public reason only excludes nonpublic reasons in 
those cases in which the proviso—that in due course participants in 
public political debate support the political measures they propose 
in terms of the principles and values of a public political conception 
of justice—is not met. One can imagine that novel political argu-
ments would be introduced in cases in which the proviso was satis-
fied and that over time these novel arguments would become part 
of the public political culture. As a result, the novel arguments 
eventually would become public reasons. 
Of course, there may remain a category of cases in which a novel 
political argument that could not itself be supported by public rea-
sons would violate the public-reason-in-due-course proviso be-
cause the novel argument is only relevant in contexts in which the 
proviso could not be met. Even in these cases, the nonpublic rea-
son could be introduced outside of public political debate, in the 
background culture. Thus, the novel argument might first be intro-
duced in academic discourse or even in an opinion piece in a news-
paper or journal of public circulation, so long as the author did not 
advance the argument as an already sufficient reason for political 
action. Again, one can imagine a process by which such novel ar-
guments came to be viewed as public reasons over time. 
Yet there may still be a category of cases in which a political 
question arises, and time does not permit gradual public accep-
tance of a novel political argument that is not itself supported by 
public reasons and that cannot be supplemented by a public reason 
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in due course. Even in this case, there seems to be no reason for 
the wide ideal of public reason to exclude the novel argument if its 
proponent believes it will be accepted by her fellow citizens as rea-
sonable. The liberal principle of legitimacy states that the exercise 
of political power is justifiable only when it is exercised in accor-
dance with constitutional essentials that all citizens may reasonably 
be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable 
to them as reasonable and rational. Although Rawls may occasion-
ally have stated his ideal of public reason in terms of preexisting 
agreement among citizens about the premises of political argu-
ment, there is nothing in his underlying arguments that requires 
this restriction. 
In sum, the Rawlsian ideal of public reason does not exclude 
novel arguments simply because they are novel. This is true for 
three reasons: first, novel reasons are public if they can be sup-
ported by public reasons; second, novel reasons may be introduced 
in the background culture and may become public reasons over 
time if they become accessible to the public at large; and third, any 
reason counts as public if it is accessible to reasonable citizens. Of 
course, some novel reasons would not count as public for the pur-
poses of Rawls’s ideal of public reason—any reason that is situated 
within a comprehensive moral or political doctrine in a way that 
makes it inaccessible to reasonable persons from outside the doc-
trine would fall into this category. For example, the reasons pro-
vided by a new prophetic religion—to the extent that their author-
ity relied on the special religious status of the prophet—would be 
novel and would not be public. 
D. From Public Reason to Public Legal Reason 
Up to this point, I have focused on the role of public reason in 
public political debate. In that context, the best ideal of public rea-
son is inclusive—it allows citizens to advance deep reasons drawn 
from their comprehensive moral and religious doctrines so long as 
public reasons are advanced in due course. At this stage, I want to 
narrow the focus of the inquiry. What are the implications of the 
idea of public reason for legal reason? The answer to this question 
will provide the materials for what I call an ideal of public legal rea-
son—the normative principles that should govern public reasoning 
about the law in a pluralist democracy. Although the discussion 
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that follows is broadly consistent with a Rawlsian approach to pub-
lic reason, the ideal of public legal reason advanced here speaks to 
a variety of issues never addressed by Rawls himself. 
The ideal of public legal reason that I advocate is an exclusive 
ideal. That is, I argue that legal officials should offer only public 
reasons for their official actions in official contexts. This ideal of 
legal reason is narrower than Rawls’s ideal of public reason, al-
though I argue that it is compatible with Rawls’s view. 
1. Public Legal Reason and the Legal Practice 
How does the idea of public reason translate into the context of 
legal practice? What constraints, if any, does the best ideal of pub-
lic reason impose on lawyers who make legal arguments and judges 
who provide reasons for their decisions in their formal written 
opinions? These questions should be distinguished from another 
set of questions—what constraints does public reason impose on 
the practice of legal scholarship? 
I begin by examining the implications of public legal reason for 
judicial reasoning.43 This is the appropriate starting point because 
judging is the place where the tread of legal reason meets the road 
of practical decisionmaking. Lawyers and legal scholars provide in-
put, but judges decide cases. By focusing on judging, I do not mean 
to diminish the importance of the role of public reason in legisla-
tive and executive deliberation and debate. After discussing judg-
ing and lawyers, I return to the legislative context and briefly com-
pare and contrast an ideal of public legal reason to the ideal that 
applies to legislators and other participants in the legislative proc-
ess. 
What about public legal reason for judges and judging? Rawls 
argued that the Supreme Court serves as an exemplar of public 
reason: “The court’s role is . . . to give due and continuing effect to 
public reason by serving as its institutional exemplar. This means, 
first, that public reason is the sole reason the court exercises.”44 Al-
though Rawls himself did not fully develop an ideal of public legal 
reason, it is clear that a Rawlsian ideal of public reason has impor-
tant implications for fundamental debates in legal theory. 
43 See William Powers, Jr., Judging Judging, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 857, 863–65 (1994). 
44 Rawls, supra note 1, at 235 (footnote omitted). 
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One might pose the question as follows: does the best ideal of 
public legal reason permit judges to invoke the deep premises of 
comprehensive moral or religious doctrines in their opinions or de-
liberations? One can imagine a variety of answers to this question. 
For example, a principle of laissez-faire would offer an unqualified 
affirmative answer, whereas a strong principle of exclusion would 
offer an unqualified negative response. The intermediate positions 
could include rules of inclusion or a mixture of laissez-faire and ex-
clusion, depending on the particular context. 
Before I proceed any further, I need to pause and consider the 
possibility that the content of the best ideal of public legal reason is 
fixed by some form of legal formalism—the normative legal theory 
that holds that the content of judicial reasoning should be limited 
to reasons provided by authoritative legal sources, and that legal 
reason should be narrowly conceived as the derivation of rules 
from precedent, the interpretation of legal texts, and the applica-
tion of legal rules to particular facts. Legal formalism can be rede-
scribed as an ideal of public legal reason that excludes direct reli-
ance on reasons of morality, religion, or political theory—whether 
shallow or deep.45 For the purposes of this Essay, I want to put this 
possibility to the side. That is, I want to assume that legal reasons 
may include direct reliance on values derived from outside the law 
itself. One way of framing this assumption would use Dworkin’s 
theory as an illustration. Assume with Dworkin that judges should 
resolve ambiguities, conflicts, and vagueness in the legal rules by 
constructing theories that fit and justify the authoritative legal ma-
terials. Legal formalists might assume that what Dworkin calls the 
“criterion of fit” can do all the work: in other words, formalists be-
lieve that we do not need to resort to moral or political philosophy 
to resolve hard cases.  For the sake of argument, let us assume that 
the legal formalists are wrong.  That is, our assumption will be that 
judges must resort to what Dworkin calls the criterion of justifica-
tion. The question then becomes, what kinds of justifications are 
allowed by the ideal of public legal reason? Dworkin’s own theory 
answers this question by going deep—Dworkin’s imaginary judge 
45 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare 
Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, U. Pa. J. Const. 
L. (forthcoming Oct. 2006). 
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Hercules sees no limit to the conceptual ascent that may be re-
quired to resolve a hard case. But I question that assumption. In 
Dworkinian terms, I ask the question whether Hercules ought to 
limit himself to public reasons when he devises the theory that best 
fits and justifies that law. 
I can frame the discussion of this question by testing the proposi-
tion that the best ideal of public legal reason would allow judges to 
rely on nonpublic reasons drawn from the deep premises of com-
prehensive religious and moral doctrines. Imagine a possible world 
that is adjacent to the actual world, with the following difference: 
judges accept a principle of laissez-faire as the governing principle 
of public legal reason. That is, judges believe that they are norma-
tively justified in relying on the deep premises of comprehensive 
moral or religious doctrines when they deliberate and when they 
write opinions. To make the test vivid, assume further that judges 
routinely disclose their actual reasoning in full. That is, assume that 
they do not suppress the deep reasons that ground their opinions 
because it would be more convenient or practical to write shorter 
opinions that reflect only the surface or shallow reasons upon 
which they rely. Moreover, assume that judges would not dissem-
ble or conceal their true beliefs in order to avoid political backlash. 
Because this possible world is adjacent to our own, the judges of 
this world reflect the moral and religious pluralism that prevails in 
the actual world. Some judges are theists; others are nonbelievers. 
Some judges are consequentialists; others are deontologists. 
What would the world of laissez-faire public legal reason be 
like? It would be a world in which judges would not infrequently 
advert to their deepest beliefs about morality or religion as reasons 
for their legal decisions. For example, in cases involving the mar-
gins of life and personhood—paradigmatically, abortion and 
euthanasia—judges might rely on deep premises about the moral 
status of persons. One judge might disclose that she relied on com-
prehensive religious doctrine, which affords the unborn full status 
as moral persons on the basis of a religious belief that the unborn 
are ensouled at the moment of conception. Another judge might 
answer that argument by contending that all religious reasons are 
based on the false premise that God exists, and that moral person-
hood depends on the capacity for reason, which does not exist until 
long after birth. To take a less charged case, imagine a tort case in 
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which one judge discloses that his decision is based on welfarism 
and that he disregarded any claims of fairness on the ground that, 
in the end, only consequences for future possible worlds are of 
moral significance. Another judge hearing the same case contends 
that the consideration of consequences is itself deeply immoral and 
that the case can only be decided on the basis of ex post reasoning 
about the rights and obligations of the parties. 
Is the possible world governed by a laissez-faire principle of pub-
lic legal reason attractive? There are at least two reasons to answer 
that question in the negative. The first reason focuses on the value 
of stability and the potential for deep disagreement to undermine 
the rule of law. The second reason focuses on the value of legiti-
macy and the difficulties of submission to legal authority with lais-
sez-faire legal reasons. 
Consider first the problem of stability. The actual world is char-
acterized by the fact of pluralism, which means that there is no re-
alistic possibility that a principle of laissez-faire public legal reason 
would result in a uniformity of opinion about the deep premises of 
theology or moral philosophy. Whatever the capacities of the doc-
trine of stare decisis are for producing consensus, those capacities 
do not extend to agreement over deep matters. Precedent is simply 
the wrong sort of reason for belief about the ultimate nature of 
morality or the existence of God. To the extent that deep premises 
drive the practice of judging, the deep foundations of the law will 
be inherently unstable—subject to tectonic shifts with the composi-
tion of various tribunals. The precise effects of these architectonic 
shifts will be difficult to predict in advance. There is no guarantee 
that they will produce rapid and destabilizing changes in the law, 
but there is no guarantee that they will not. Moreover, one of the 
things that people want from the law is a stable foundation. The 
value of a stable foundation for the law is reflected in the great 
value placed on the rule of law and the associated values of pre-
dictability, stability, and certainty. 
Consider second the problem of legitimacy. In the possible world 
governed by the laissez-faire ideal of public legal reason, it will in-
evitably be the case that many or most citizens will reject the par-
ticular comprehensive religious or moral doctrine that provides the 
crucial deep premises for some decisions. That is, many or most 
citizens will not believe that these decisions rest on reasonable 
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grounds. Of course, it will inevitably be the case that the law may 
rest on premises about facts or values that are not universally ac-
ceptable. But the problem posed by direct reliance on deep prem-
ises of particular moral or political doctrines is much more substan-
tial than this. It is one thing to be asked to cooperate on the basis 
of reasons that are justified by premises one can regard as reason-
able but in error. It is quite another to be asked to cooperate on 
the basis of reasons that one cannot regard as reasonable. 
For example, it is one thing to be asked to accept an authorita-
tive decision based on contestable evidence that dioxin causes can-
cer. It is quite another to be asked to accept that God’s plan re-
quires that women be subservient—or, for that matter, for a 
believer to be asked to accept a decision based on the premise that 
God does not exist. It is one thing to be asked to accept an authori-
tative decision that global warming poses a serious danger. It is 
quite another to be asked to accept an authoritative decision prem-
ised on the moral principle that only consequences count—or, for 
that matter, for a utilitarian to be asked to accept a decision based 
on the moral premise that only rights count. Reasonable citizens 
are under no obligation to regard themselves as legitimately bound 
by the authority of decisions that rest on deep premises that they 
cannot accept as reasonable. Given the fact of pluralism, many or 
most citizens will regard any legal decision that rests on deep and 
controversial premises of religious or moral doctrines as illegiti-
mate in the sense that it lacks reasonable justification. 
Legitimacy is to the authority of law as water is to fish and air is 
to mammals. When law claims authority, it asks for compliance—
that those to whom the law is addressed will accept the law as pro-
viding a good reason for action. Authority can be legitimate or ille-
gitimate. Illegitimate authority must provide prudential reasons for 
action—incentives for obedience or punishment for disobedience. 
A regime of illegitimate authority can be oppressive, ineffectual, or 
both. It can be oppressive because the reliable imposition of sanc-
tions without voluntary cooperation requires legal institutions that 
provide pervasive monitoring and frequent punishment, and it can 
be ineffectual because rates of coerced compliance are likely to be 
lower than rates of voluntary cooperation with legitimate author-
ity. Moreover, the evil of illegitimacy is not limited to the realm of 
the practical. Legitimacy reconciles citizens to the binding force of 
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law; illegitimacy undermines the basis for reconciliation and hence 
the moral worth of citizenship. 
Judging provides an illustrative context for the implications of an 
ideal of public legal reason for legal practice, but there are other 
important contexts, including legal advocacy and legislation. There 
is one sense in which the ideal of public legal reason that applies to 
judges would apply to lawyers: if a lawyer makes an argument 
upon which a judge may not rely, the argument will either be futile 
or give rise to a wrongful use of nonpublic reason. However, there 
are circumstances in which lawyers may be obligated to make ar-
guments outside the bounds of public legal reason. One such cir-
cumstance is the adequate representation of clients who disagree 
with the ideal of public legal reason. As a matter of procedural 
fairness, the lawyer may have an obligation to represent the dis-
senting view to the court, even without expecting that the court will 
act on the nonpublic reasons that are presented.46 A full discussion 
of the similarities and differences between public reason for courts 
and legislatures would take us too far afield, but it may be reason-
able to allow legislators greater freedom to include nonpublic rea-
sons, even when they discuss or deliberate about legislation in for-
mal contexts such as the floor of Congress.47
46 Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 281 (2004) (“A 
citizen who could be finally bound may wish to raise points that either cannot, or 
likely will not, have any effect on the outcome of the proceeding. An important ex-
ample of this involves what we might call ‘principled dissent from legal norms.’ Even 
if I have no viable legal argument against a legal norm that binds me, I may have an 
interest in making (or even attempting to make) arguments that the norm is illegiti-
mate.”). 
47 A full account of the ideal of public reason appropriate to the legislative process 
goes beyond the scope of this Essay, but the following observations may be helpful. 
Legislative reasons are provided in many different contexts. The most formal and 
public of these include official documents such as the preambles of statutes, commit-
tee reports, and the like. In those contexts, reasons are offered on behalf of the public 
and are addressed, in part, to legal officials who may interpret the legislation. In these 
official contexts, the standard for legislative public reason may be identical to the 
standard for adjudicative public reason. At the other end of the spectrum, legislators 
may provide their reasons for supporting or opposing legislation in informal contexts, 
including statements to the media or speeches to constituents. In these informal con-
texts, an inclusive ideal of public reason—like the Rawlsian ideal outlined above—
seems appropriate. An intermediate case is posed by statements on the floor of a leg-
islative assembly, which are made on behalf of individual legislators, but are also part 
of the official legislative history. A reasonable case might be made for either an inclu-
sive or exclusive ideal in this intermediate context. 
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2. The Implications of Public Legal Reason for Normative Legal 
Theory 
Normative legal theory takes place in what Rawls calls the back-
ground culture, which he defines as “the culture of the social, not 
of the political. It is the culture of daily life, of its many associa-
tions: churches and universities, learned and scientific societies, 
and clubs and teams, to mention a few.”48
The ideal of public legal reason that applies to legal practice 
should not apply directly to legal scholars when they debate and 
discuss legal policies or normative legal theories. The phrase 
“normative legal theory” is ambiguous. By “normative legal the-
ory,” I mean to refer to a subset of legal scholarship (broadly un-
derstood) that evaluates the criteria of normative desirability for 
law or that applies those criteria to particular questions of legal 
policy. Paradigmatically, normative legal theory is practiced by le-
gal academics, but lawyers and judges frequently engage in this 
practice when they are “out of court,” metaphorically speaking. 
The propositional content of normative legal theory and legal prac-
tice could be identical. That is, the very same normative reason 
could be advanced either in a law review article or in a judicial 
opinion. Of course, the propositional content may differ. High 
normative legal theory—with explicit references to metaethics as 
well as to moral and political philosophy—is almost never an ex-
plicit part of legal practice. The contrary proposition does not hold: 
legal scholarship frequently includes doctrinal analysis identical to 
that which occurs in judicial opinions. 
The conclusion that normative legal theory should not be gov-
erned by the ideal of public legal reason that applies to legal prac-
tice is unsurprising and should not be controversial. Legal theorists 
should be free to investigate the soundness of the ideal of public 
legal reason. Moreover, normative legal theory may legitimately 
consider hypothetical circumstances in which the fact of pluralism 
does not obtain. In a possible world in which there is universal con-
sensus that welfarism was true, there would be no reason to ex-
clude the deep premises of welfarism from the ideal of public legal 
reason. Of course, even in this possible world, nonpublic reasons 
would remain: the partial or personal reasons of judges would still 
48 Rawls, supra note 1, at 14. 
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be proscribed by the norms that governed judicial deliberation and 
opinion writing. 
But even if the ideal of public legal reason appropriate to the ac-
tual world (in which the fact of pluralism does obtain) does not ap-
ply directly to normative legal theory and normative arguments 
about legal policy, it does apply indirectly. I now turn to the argu-
ment for indirect restraint of normative legal theory. 
3. The Relationship Between Normative Legal Theory and Legal 
Practice 
One of the important questions for normative legal theory bears 
an extremely close relationship to legal practice. Sometimes nor-
mative legal theorists ask how judges should decide a particular 
question of legal policy in the actual world, given the fact of plural-
ism. Indeed, this form of legal scholarship is ubiquitous—it domi-
nates the law reviews and treatises. When normative legal theorists 
take up this particular task, advising judges about what they should 
do and what reasons they should give for doing it, they necessarily 
assume those restraints for political morality that constrain those 
whom they advise. In other words, normative legal theorists should 
not advise judges to do something that would be improper given 
the ideal of public legal reason that applies. 
To be clear, my claim is not that legal theorists may not discuss 
the ways in which nonpublic reasons bear on legal issues in the ac-
tual world. Legal theorists are free to discuss the implications of re-
ligious doctrines (such as Buddhism or Roman Catholicism) or 
comprehensive moral doctrines (such as utilitarianism or Kantian 
ethics) for particular issues of legal policy as they arise in the actual 
world. Such discussion does not offend a duty of political morality 
until and unless it crosses the line from theoretical discussion in the 
background culture to advocacy, recommendation, or advice for 
legal practice. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that the line be-
tween advocacy and advice on the one hand and theoretical discus-
sion on the other will sometimes be fuzzy—many morally relevant 
lines have this property. That lines are fuzzy does not mean they 
cannot guide practice: intermediate cases can be resolved either by 
careful deliberation about the particular context or by rules of 
thumb that group recurring situations for reasons of practical con-
venience. 
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Another clarification requires recalling the distinction between 
positive and normative law and economics and then marking a dis-
tinction between two different claims that normative legal econo-
mists might make. Nothing in this account of an ideal of public le-
gal reason suggests that legal economists should refrain from 
scholarship that engages in the positive project of delineating the 
consequences of various legal policy options for welfare. This en-
terprise is entirely unobjectionable—even though the definition of 
welfare employed may be controversial if it were to serve in a 
normative rather than a positive role. Within the project of norma-
tive law and economics, one must distinguish between two differ-
ent claims that might be made. What one might call the strong wel-
farist claim would be the claim that only welfare should count for 
the purpose of making legal policy. One can then distinguish what 
might be called the weak welfarist claim—that welfare is one of the 
factors that should be considered. Nothing in the ideal of public le-
gal reason counsels against the weak welfarist claim. The idea that 
preferences should be taken into account can easily be accommo-
dated within an ideal of public reason, so long as the reason for 
their relevance is not given in terms of a deep and controversial 
premise of moral theory. 
There is an objection to my account of the relationship between 
normative legal theory and legal practice that deserves considera-
tion at this point. Even assuming that the ideal of public legal rea-
son that I have offered here is correct, one might argue that legal 
theorists ought to convince legal practitioners to engage in dissimu-
lation and deception. That is, one might take the position that the 
role of legal theory is to advocate the best legal policies on the ba-
sis of the best (or true, or correct) reasons. If these reasons fail the 
test of the ideal of public reason, then there is a further question: as 
a matter of rhetoric (and not truth), can the best policy be justified 
on the basis of public reasons? If the policy cannot be given a plau-
sible justification with public legal reasons, then the legal theorist 
should not advocate or recommend the policy. If, however, plausi-
ble public legal reasons are available, then the normative legal the-
ory should advocate adoption of the policy on the basis of one set 
of reasons, knowing that judges will need to justify the policy based 
on a different set of reasons. Put baldly, the argument is that judges 
should lie about the true reasons for their decisions. 
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From a purely consequentialist perspective, the practice of judi-
cial dissimulation will be justified so long as it produces good con-
sequences. And it might be argued that dissimulation offers “the 
best of both worlds,” that is, the advantages of reliance on the best 
comprehensive moral or religious theory combined with perceived 
legitimacy. There is, of course, the risk that legal practice will not 
remain opaque. To the extent that the public becomes aware of a 
practice of judicial dissimulation, this awareness might have a dele-
gitimizing effect. For this reason, normative legal theorists would 
be well advised not to openly advocate dissimulation. A variety of 
techniques might be employed for the theorist to give oblique ad-
vice. For example, a theorist might argue on two fronts: (1) that a 
particular legal policy is best on the basis of deep reasons; and (2) 
that the same policy is justified by the best interpretation of the au-
thoritative legal materials. That is, the theorist could offer judges a 
formalist rationale for a result to be reached on the basis of purely 
normative internal deliberation. Without naming names, it might 
even be argued that some legal theorists do precisely this. 
In other words, it could be argued that legal theorists should 
themselves dissimulate by advocating or advising in ways that are 
intentionally misleading or deceptive. Nothing that can be said in 
this Essay is likely to change any minds about the wisdom or mo-
rality of lying. I can state my own position—that such lying would 
violate duties of political morality and compromise personal integ-
rity—but those who are not averse to dissimulation are unlikely to 
place much credence in personal testimony. Some may even dis-
count such testimony as mere “cheap talk.”49
E. Public Legal Reason, Welfarism, and Private Law 
The context of private law has exemplary significance. Norma-
tive law and economics has been particularly influential in private-
law fields.50 Although normative law and economics undoubtedly 
has important contributions to make to public law, some public-law 
49 On “cheap talk” in a different context, see Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. 
McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute 
Resolution, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1229, 1263–81 (2004). 
50 See Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge 
Guido Calabresi, 64 Md. L. Rev. 220, 227 (2005) (observing that most law and eco-
nomics addresses private law). 
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topics—including issues involving so-called “human” or “funda-
mental” rights—have received relatively little attention from legal 
economists. Unlike private-law fields where law-and-economics 
scholarship is certainly very important and arguably dominant, it 
cannot be said that normative law and economics dominates pub-
lic-law theory. For this reason, it is important to note that the ideal 
of public legal reason applies fully to private legal practice. That is, 
legal practitioners should not rely on the deep and controversial 
premises of comprehensive religious or moral theories when they 
decide private-law cases. 
What are the implications of an ideal of public legal reason for 
the debate between welfarism and fairness in the context of private 
law? The implications of the discussion so far can be summarized 
in the form of brief conclusions: 
(1) The ideal of public legal reason applies to legal practice 
within the domain of private law. 
(2) The ideal of public legal reason does not require that welfa-
rism be abandoned as a paradigm for normative legal theory as 
practiced in the legal academy (or elsewhere in the background 
culture). 
(3) The ideal of public legal reason does not proscribe weak wel-
farist claims in the context of advocacy or advice to legal practi-
tioners. 
(4) The ideal of public legal reason does proscribe the strong 
welfarist claim that welfarism is the only appropriate method for 
the resolution of questions of legal policy within the domain of 
private law. 
(5) The ideal of public legal reason does allow the consideration 
of reasons of fairness for the resolution of questions of legal pol-
icy within the domain of private law, provided that the reasons 
are drawn from or supported by public values. 
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F. Reflexive or Question Begging? 
Before leaving this central Part of the Essay, I consider a final 
objection. One might maintain that the argument made here is 
question begging—that is, it assumes the conclusion that strong 
welfarist claims are inappropriate for legal practices—when it lays 
out the normative foundations of the ideal of public legal reason. 
Certainly, one can imagine an account of public legal reason that 
would be susceptible to this objection—all that would be required 
would be the deployment of some deep anticonsequentialist prem-
ise in the argument for the ideal. But such an objection is wholly 
inapplicable to the argument offered here, which refrains from 
deep premises and relies only on public values. 
This fact about the argument—that the justification for the ideal 
of public legal reason relies on public reasons—points to an impor-
tant feature of the case made here. It is reflexive—relying only on 
premises that are acceptable to the theory of reasons offered by the 
ideal. This reflexivity is not circularity, although, as is always the 
case, circularity and reflexivity superficially share a certain struc-
ture. Reflexivity is a necessary property of good normative theories 
of reasons. This point is easily demonstrated. If a theory of public 
reason relied on nonpublic reasons for its justification, the theory 
would be internally inconsistent. 
The reflexivity of the justifications offered for a theory of public 
reasons does not, however, mean that nonpublic reasons do not 
have an important role to play in the discussion of such theories. In 
the background culture—for example, in the legal academy—it is 
perfectly appropriate to inquire whether the case for an ideal of 
public reason can be made within the confines of particular com-
prehensive doctrines—whether they be religious or philosophical. 
This task naturally takes a particular form within the scholarly en-
terprise of normative legal theory: legal theorists can inquire 
whether the ideal of public legal reason is compatible with various 
theories—deontological, consequentialist, and aretaic. To the ex-
tent that such a theory can be the focus of an overlapping consen-
sus51 between such theories, both its foundations and potential for 
stability are improved. To the extent that any particular compre-
51 See Rawls, supra note 1, at 133–72 (discussing the idea of an overlapping consen-
sus). 
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hensive doctrine cannot participate in such an overlapping consen-
sus, two worries arise. For those who are tempted by the compre-
hensive doctrine but are also committed to the public values that 
underwrite the ideal of public legal reason, their worry concerns 
the coherence of their own views—inconsistency implies that 
something must go. For those who are committed to the compre-
hensive doctrine but who do not share the public values, their 
worry concerns the possibility of reconciling themselves to the po-
litical culture in which they live. Of course, reconciliation is not re-
quired for a satisfying life; a life of resistance or withdrawal can be 
a life of integrity. 
III. WELFARISM AT THE BAR OF PUBLIC LEGAL REASON 
So far, the discussion of public legal reason has been abstract 
and general. Let’s make the discussion a bit more concrete and 
particular by applying it to a specific controversy in normative legal 
theory—the fairness-versus-welfare debate as exemplified by the 
claims made by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell. 
A. Kaplow and Shavell’s Argument for Welfarism 
Kaplow and Shavell have attempted to demonstrate that any 
conceivable theory or method of policy evaluation that departs 
from welfarism violates weak Pareto for some pair of possible 
worlds. They believe that this argument is important because of the 
great intuitive plausibility of weak Pareto, which merely states that 
if we compare two possible worlds with counterpart individuals and 
every individual is better off in one of these worlds, then that world 
is better. Putting it another way, given a choice between two 
courses of action, only one of which will improve the welfare of 
each and every individual, then that course of action is the right 
one. 
Here is an example that illustrates the core idea of Kaplow and 
Shavell’s argument. Suppose policies are evaluated on the basis of 
fairness and not exclusively on the basis of welfare. For example, as 
a matter of fairness, criminals should always be punished if they 
deserve it, even when everyone would prefer that they not be pun-
ished. How might this happen? Of course, it is usually the case that 
criminals will prefer not to be punished, and it is frequently the 
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case that their friends and family would prefer they not be pun-
ished. It is easy to imagine a plausible case in which even the victim 
would prefer mercy, and the police, prosecutors, judge, and jury all 
wished they were not required to impose a punishment. Now imag-
ine the (less plausible, but theoretically possible) case in which eve-
ryone prefers that the criminal not be punished. (Perhaps the case 
is so celebrated that everyone in the world has formed an opinion 
about it.) If society followed a principle that always required the 
deserved punishment to be imposed, then everyone would be made 
worse off—assuming that being better or worse off is a function of 
individual preferences. Therefore, taking fairness into account in 
punishment could result in making everyone worse off.52 If the 
same person who affirms the weak Pareto principle as a true nor-
mative premise also believes that fairness should be considered in 
evaluating legal policies, that individual is seemingly committed to 
contradictory beliefs. 
In their book Fairness versus Welfare, Kaplow and Shavell make 
several arguments in favor of welfarism. In large part, Kaplow and 
Shavell’s argumentative strategy is simply to remind legal analysts 
that fairness is in tension with welfare. In other words, Kaplow and 
Shavell remind their readers that fairness may require a sacrifice in 
the total sum of welfare (or good consequences). This strategy will 
appeal to readers with strong consequentialist intuitions, and it 
may convince readers who have failed to appreciate the many ways 
in which prioritizing fairness may require the acceptance of bad 
consequences. But this argumentative strategy is unlikely to per-
suade legal analysts who accept the proposition that fairness is in 
tension with welfare, but who nonetheless believe that fairness 
should trump welfare, at least in certain conditions. To these read-
ers, Kaplow and Shavell’s argument seems question begging.53 The 
52 Although this brief example illustrates Kaplow and Shavell’s idea, it is not a rig-
orous presentation of their position. Many readers may see obvious objections to this 
simplified version of their argument. In fairness to Kaplow and Shavell, their claims 
should not be evaluated on the basis of my simplified version of their argument. 
53 In fact, Kaplow and Shavell’s argument need not be interpreted as question beg-
ging. Rather, the charitable interpretation of their argument is that it employs the 
method of reflective equilibrium. By eliciting considered judgments about particular 
contexts in which fairness would lead to bad consequences, Kaplow and Shavell try to 
undermine the more abstract judgment that fairness should sometimes (or always) 
trump consequentialist considerations. In other words, Kaplow and Shavell are not 
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argument made in the previous Part of this Essay suggests that 
Kaplow and Shavell’s arguments are not good reasons within legal 
practice to the extent that Kaplow and Shavell rely, either explic-
itly or implicitly, on deep consequentialist premises. 
Kaplow and Shavell’s argument that fairness can violate weak 
Pareto is of particular interest because it may provide them with a 
public reason for affirming welfarism as the exclusive method for 
the evaluation of legal policies. Kaplow and Shavell claim that it is 
unreasonable (and perhaps even irrational) to prefer a possible 
world that makes everyone worse off. Whether or not they say so 
directly, their arguments seem to imply that their proof gives those 
who adhere to an ideal of public legal reason a good and sufficient 
reason to affirm welfarism. In other words, we can redescribe their 
claim as the claim that they have convincing public reasons to af-
firm welfarism, and that these public reasons should convince ra-
tional or reasonable adherents of nonconsequentialist comprehen-
sive moral doctrines. 
B. Kaplow and Shavell’s Version of Welfarism 
Kaplow and Shavell’s core idea is that we should evaluate legal 
policies solely on the basis of their impact on human well-being or 
“welfare.” This core idea implies that legal analysts54 should exam-
ine the consequences of those policies, but only if they affect wel-
fare. This view is what Kaplow and Shavell call “welfarism.” 
To understand Kaplow and Shavell’s claim, it is important to 
note that it is a view about the evaluation of possible worlds; it is 
not presented as an action-guiding theory. At first this distinction 
may seem trivial because one might assume that Kaplow and Shav-
ell believe that one ought to act so as to achieve the best possible 
world. This is not the case, however, and this seemingly peculiar 
trying to argue that welfare should trump fairness because the alternative would be 
fairness at the price of welfare; instead, they are arguing that reasonable persons will 
reevaluate their commitment to fairness once they understand the high price that 
must be paid for that commitment. 
54 “Legal analysts” are primarily legal academics, but this category includes social 
scientists, policy analysts in think tanks, and others. Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness ver-
sus Welfare (article), supra note 3, at 1306. Kaplow and Shavell contrast this group to 
ordinary citizens and to policymakers (such as legislators and judges). Id. at 1305, 
1318. 
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feature of Kaplow and Shavell’s theory has substantial significance. 
Kaplow and Shavell are very explicit that they are concerned with 
the evaluation rather than the making of policy: 
Although our thesis is that legal policy analysts should rely ex-
clusively on welfare economics, the important role of internal-
ized social norms suggests that the situation of legal decision-
makers, notably legislators, regulators, and judges, is more 
complicated than that of legal policy analysts, who are mainly 
academics. The reason is that legal decisionmakers must trans-
late the advice of the analysts into policies for which the deci-
sionmakers are generally accountable to ordinary citizens—and 
citizens, in turn, may be more familiar with notions of fairness.55
What are we to make of this claim? I will attempt to unpack the 
various strands of thought in this brief passage. First, Kaplow and 
Shavell tell us that “legal decisionmakers must translate the advice 
of analysts into policies.” This passage makes it clear that welfa-
rism does not directly guide action. Rather, they imagine a three-
step process. In step one, the legal analyst utilizes welfarism to 
evaluate policy options. In step two, the decisionmakers act on the 
basis of this advice. The next portion of the passage, “for which the 
decisionmakers are generally accountable to ordinary citizens—
and citizens, in turn, may be more familiar with notions of fair-
ness,” suggests a third step. Decisionmakers may be required to 
provide citizens with an explanation of their actions that differs 
from the actual basis of the decision. 
One should not, I think, place too much emphasis on the three-
step process. This is a brief passage, and may not represent a fully 
developed version of Kaplow and Shavell’s ideas. The core notion 
expressed in the passage, however, is familiar from the history of 
utilitarianism. Indeed, a view similar to that expressed by Kaplow 
and Shavell has been given the derogatory label “government-
house utilitarianism.” Government-house utilitarianism is the view 
that decisionmakers (who in the familiar British locution occupy 
“government house”) ought to be utilitarians, whereas ordinary 
people ought to adhere to a simpler set of moral norms (“internal-
ized social norms,” in Kaplow and Shavell’s parlance). Kaplow and 
55 Id. at 974. 
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Shavell’s view might be called “ivory-tower welfarism,” as they 
seem to believe the pure version of welfarism should only be prac-
ticed by “legal analysts,” that is, those who are employed by aca-
demic and similar institutions. Ivory-tower welfarism is practiced 
only by those who do not make policy; in other words, it is a theory 
of evaluation and not a theory of action. Ivory-tower welfarism 
pushes the locus at which the true, correct, or deep explanations 
are to be found from the government house to the ivory tower. 
Another clarification concerns the sense in which Kaplow and 
Shavell are welfarists. Kaplow and Shavell are welfarists, but they 
are welfarists of a particular sort. They deploy a subjective inter-
pretation of the concept of welfare. Kaplow and Shavell’s concep-
tion of welfare is based solely on individual preferences among 
possible worlds or preference satisfaction. Recall that the form of a 
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function is W(x) = F (U1(x), 
U2(x), . . . UN(x)). Kaplow-Shavell welfarism takes the form of a so-
cial-welfare function that evaluates only individual utility informa-
tion. 
C. An Informal Explication of the Kaplow-Shavell Proof 
Having investigated Kaplow and Shavell’s version of welfarism, 
we turn our attention to an explication of their proof that nonwel-
farist methods of evaluation violate weak Pareto. The aim of Kap-
low and Shavell’s proof is to show that any possible theory that in-
cludes fairness as a factor in the evaluation of legal policies can 
yield the conclusion that we should prefer a policy that would 
make everyone worse off, as compared to some alternative policy. 
They offer both an informal and a formal version of the proof, but 
both versions share the same general idea and the same strategy of 
proof. In this Essay I focus on the informal version of the proof; 
elsewhere, I argue that the formal version is invalid in the technical 
sense that the conclusion of the argument does not follow from its 
premises.56
The general idea of Kaplow and Shavell’s proof is that for any 
nonwelfarist theory of evaluation, T, there is at least one pair of 
56 See Lawrence B. Solum, Of Pareto and Possible Worlds: A Critique of Kaplow 
and Shavell’s Argument for Welfarism (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Virginia Law Review Association). 
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possible worlds, P and Q, such that T evaluates P as superior to Q, 
but each and every individual prefers Q to P. It follows that any 
nonwelfarist T can violate weak Pareto. Any welfarist theory of 
evaluation T must comply with weak Pareto because by definition 
all such theories are social welfare functions that (1) consider only 
individual welfare information, (2) consider that information 
anonymously, and (3) are increasing functions of individual wel-
fare. 
As I have presented it, the general idea of Kaplow and Shavell’s 
proof omits a crucial element. How do they show that for nonwel-
farist theory T there is a pair of possible worlds such that T violates 
weak Pareto? Kaplow and Shavell’s basic argumentative strategy is 
to offer examples that can be generalized so as to apply to every 
possible nonwelfarist theory. In their informal proof, they use ex-
amples that employ an assumption of symmetry. For example, they 
explore the effect of a rule that requires tort compensation for neg-
ligence on fairness grounds in a world where everyone inflicts ex-
actly the same negligent injuries as they suffer. In this possible 
world, compensation injures everyone. In their formal proof, they 
employ an example that simply assumes that everyone is indiffer-
ent to fairness and then introduces the possibility that achieving 
fairness imposes a cost. In other words, if for any principle of fair-
ness there is a pair of possible worlds in which everyone is indiffer-
ent to fairness, but fairness imposes costs that everyone prefers not 
to incur, then complying with any principle of fairness can violate 
weak Pareto. 
The informal proof establishes that some nonwelfarist theories 
can violate weak Pareto. Kaplow and Shavell believe that the for-
mal version of the proof establishes that all nonwelfarist theories 
violate weak Pareto in certain particular circumstances. This is be-
cause the informal version of the proof relies on symmetrical impo-
sition of injuries and the costs of compensation in order to generate 
the example. Kaplow and Shavell do not attempt to argue that 
every possible nonwelfarist theory suffers from the symmetry prob-
lem. In the formal version of the proof, they simply assume that 
there is “a good such that, if each person has δ more of it, then 
each person is better off.”57 They then claim that with respect to 
57 Kaplow & Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method, supra note 2, at 283. 
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any nonwelfarist method of evaluation, there will always be a trip-
let of possible worlds X, Y, and Z such that the nonwelfarist 
method of evaluation prefers X to Y—for whatever reason is rele-
vant to the theory. Kaplow and Shavell then claim that it will al-
ways be possible to identify Z, a possible world that is identical to 
Y, except that in Z, each and every person has δ more of the good 
that will make “each person better off.” The nonwelfarist theory 
will claim that X is preferred to Z, but everyone is better off in Z 
than in X. This violates the weak Pareto principle because that 
principle states that a possible world in which everyone is better off 
is to be preferred for that reason. 
D. Weak Pareto Fails the Test of Public Legal Reason 
Does Kaplow and Shavell’s proof provide a public reason for af-
firming welfarism? The weak Pareto principle is the normative 
linchpin of their argument. Recall that the weak Pareto principle 
can be expressed as follows: “It is never the case that a possible 
world P that makes everyone worse off as compared to possible 
world Q is better than Q.” If weak Pareto provides a public legal 
reason, and if all of the premises of Kaplow and Shavell’s proof are 
true and the proof is valid, it would follow that Kaplow and Shav-
ell’s argument would provide both legal scholars and judges a good 
reason to be welfarists. 
From the point of view of an ideal of public legal reason, the is-
sue is whether weak Pareto is the kind of principle that is accessi-
ble to all reasonable citizens. Rawls himself seemed to limit the 
normative resources of public reason to public political values—
values that can be drawn from the public political culture such as 
the fundamental equality of citizens. The weak Pareto principle is 
not that kind of value. Weak Pareto is a technical economic princi-
ple. Although weak Pareto is familiar to economists and some 
moral and political philosophers, it is almost unknown to citizens 
outside the academy. It certainly is not the kind of principle that is 
widely accepted by the public at large. 
But this does not settle the matter. I have already established 
that novel reasons can be public reasons if they are publicly acces-
sible.58 Weak Pareto seems to rest on an intuitively plausible and 
58 See supra Section II.C. 
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noncontroversial idea—that it can never be a good idea to make 
everyone worse off. Even those who are unsympathetic to maxi-
mizing theories such as utilitarianism might be willing to assent to 
weak Pareto. Indeed, weak Pareto has the ring of an obvious truth 
or tautology. Why? Because if the only description of a choice 
available is that the choice violates weak Pareto, one would assume 
that the universal welfare loss would be senseless—that is, viola-
tion of weak Pareto seems to imply incurring a cost without reason. 
But the intuitive plausibility of weak Pareto cannot be sustained 
once the full content of the weak Pareto principle is made fully ex-
plicit. The form of weak Pareto that garners very wide acceptance 
is something like “it is never right to make everyone worse off.” 
This form is different from “it is never right to act in a way that is 
contrary to everyone’s preferences.” Given the fact of pluralism, 
different citizens will understand “worse off” differently. Weak 
Pareto is intuitively plausible only until one specifies a conception 
of welfare. Once the conception is specified, then its accessibility 
becomes limited to those who share the conception. 
Moreover, many citizens are likely to reject preference-
satisfaction as the best conception of individual well-being. The ob-
jections to the preference view are well known. For example, many 
persons have preferences that are inconsistent with their own ob-
jective self-interests. Some people prefer to eat rich food, even 
though it is bad for their health. Some prefer to gamble, even 
though it will impoverish their families. Some prefer to drink in-
toxicating beverages, even though they will damage their livers. 
Once the ambiguity in weak Pareto is exposed, Kaplow and 
Shavell’s own argument can be run against them. That is, if one 
takes only preference satisfaction into account in evaluating possi-
ble worlds, one could prefer a world in which everyone’s objective 
well-being was injured. To the extent that many of Kaplow and 
Shavell’s readers will affirm a conception of well-being that is not 
based solely on preference satisfaction, Kaplow and Shavell claim 
to have a form of argument that should convince the reader to re-
ject their own theory. Indeed, one might ask Kaplow and Shavell if 
they would accept the principle that one should never prefer a pos-
sible world in which everyone suffers substantial damage to his ob-
jective well-being, including health, mental abilities, and resources. 
If they accept this proposition, then, by their own rationale, their 
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affirmance of welfarism is unreasonable. If they reject this proposi-
tion, one might ask them for an explanation as to why they reject it. 
E. Kaplow and Shavell Rely on Dubious Modal Assumptions 
It is quite striking that Kaplow and Shavell begin their proof 
with three premises that define the set of all possible worlds. Their 
own statement of their proof begins with the following three sen-
tences: 
(1) Let x denote a complete description of the world. 
(2) In particular, x includes a comprehensive account of each of n 
individuals’ situations and of anything that might be relevant un-
der any method of evaluating the state of the world. 
(3) Let X be the set of all conceivable states of the world.59  
This is no accident. The crucial work in Kaplow and Shavell’s proof 
is performed by implicit modal assumptions—that is, by unstated 
assumptions about what is possible. When Kaplow and Shavell 
claim that we can always posit a possible world where everyone 
gets enough of some good to make them better off, they are mak-
ing a modal claim. 
Possibility is a very tricky concept because any claim about pos-
sibility is potentially ambiguous. “Possible” in what sense? The 
possibility problem with Kaplow and Shavell’s argument is that 
once this question is answered, it both undermines the value of the 
proof and poses consistency problems for Kaplow and Shavell. 
How can one get a handle on possibility? One tool for removing 
ambiguity about possibility is possible-worlds semantics.60 The mo-
dal assertion “H is possible” translates into the statement “H is 
true in some possible world.” In other words, if I say “it is possible 
that Morse is a Yankees fan,” that translates into “Morse is a Yan-
kees fan in some possible world.” 
Possible-worlds semantics allows one to distinguish the various 
senses in which one says that “H is possible” or “J could have hap-
pened.” For example, take the broadest notion of possibility, logi-
59 Kaplow & Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method, supra note 2, at 283. 
60 See generally John Divers, Possible Worlds (2002). 
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cal possibility. “J is logically possible” translates to “J is true in at 
least one possible world—that is, in at least one world in which 
there are no logical contradictions.” Logicians and philosophers 
use the word “accessibility” to define sets of possible worlds with 
respect to various senses of possibility. Thus, the possible worlds in 
which there are no logical contradictions are logically accessible. 
The possible worlds that obey the laws of science are nomologi-
cally accessible. The possible worlds that are consistent with every-
thing that we know are epistemologically accessible. The possible 
worlds that share the history of the world up to the present mo-
ment are historically accessible. The possible world that we now 
inhabit is the actual world. The worlds that are historically accessi-
ble from the actual world are the possible worlds that share the his-
tory of the actual world up until now. Worlds that are both histori-
cally and nomologically accessible share both the history of the 
actual world and its natural laws. 
Kaplow and Shavell’s proof relies on several implicit assertions 
about possibility. The most important of these is contained in the 
following premise of their original proof: “Construct x’’ from x’ by 
increasing each mi in x’ by a positive amount δ.”
61 (The variables x’’ 
and x’ name possible worlds.) This locution is the means by which 
Kaplow and Shavell express the claim that for any nonwelfarist 
theory, there is at least one triplet of possible worlds, X, Y, and Z, 
such that Z is identical to Y except that in Z, each and every indi-
vidual receives an amount δ of some good that suffices to make one 
better off. What sense of possibility is involved in this implicit mo-
dal claim? 
The first sense of possibility is logical possibility. This sense is 
suggested by Kaplow and Shavell’s reference to “the set of all con-
ceivable states of the world.” Although logical possibility would al-
low Kaplow and Shavell’s proof to go through, it creates other in-
tractable problems for them. Once Kaplow and Shavell deploy 
logical possibility in their proof, they then become committed to 
the proposition that normative theories must hold for all logically 
possible worlds. But this proposition sanctions a whole host of ar-
guments against welfarism. For example, there is a pair of logically 
possible worlds, one in which innocent children are tortured to sat-
61 Kaplow & Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method, supra note 2, at 284. 
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isfy sadists and one in which they are not, such that a given conse-
quentialist theory (for example, utilitarianism) evaluates the world 
in which the children are tortured as preferable to the world in 
which they are not tortured. This case is one of a parade of horri-
bles used in a standard set of objections against utilitarianism. Kap-
low and Shavell reject the use of these examples as unrealistic;62 
that is, they argue that welfarist theories need only produce plausi-
ble results in “realistic” possible worlds, where “realistic” rules out 
possible worlds that do not satisfy unspecified accessibility condi-
tions. 
Suppose then, that Kaplow and Shavell limit themselves to what 
we can call “practical” possibility. They might, for example, con-
sider only those possible worlds that are historically and nomologi-
cally accessible—possible worlds that share the history of the ac-
tual world up to now and that obey the laws of science. Now, 
however, there is a problem with Kaplow and Shavell’s proof. The 
third possible world in their proof is not historically and nomologi-
cally accessible. Recall that Z is identical to Y, the world in which 
some nonwelfarist consideration, such as punishing the guilty, is 
satisfied, except that in Y, each and every individual gets some 
good that each and every individual would prefer to receive. 
Where does this good come from? How is it possible that everyone 
in the whole world would prefer to receive more of this good? How 
could complying with a fairness principle (for example, by punish-
ing one person) cause everyone in the world to lose some quantity 
of the good? Once we confine ourselves to practical possibilities, it 
is not clear that one could find even a single violation of weak 
Pareto—much less show that every nonwelfarist theory can violate 
weak Pareto. This conclusion bears repeating: it is not clear that 
Kaplow and Shavell can show that any fairness theory violates weak 
Pareto for historically and nomologically accessible possible worlds. 
How could Kaplow and Shavell deal with the possibility prob-
lem? Perhaps they can specify a sense of possibility that cuts off the 
cases that are damaging to welfarism but preserves violations of 
weak Pareto for every nonwelfarist theory. This seems a daunting 
task, but even if they are able to accomplish it, they must show that 
the specified sense of possibility is of normative significance—that 
62 Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (article), supra note 3, at 1273. 
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it is morally relevant. It will not do for them to choose some arbi-
trary sense of possibility that does their dirty work. They must 
show that the sense of possibility that validates their position is not 
simply a post hoc fix for the possibility problem. I pose this as a 
challenge to Kaplow and Shavell, but, to be frank, I cannot con-
ceive of a way in which they could meet the challenge. We may 
someday find that a small population of dodos still survives. With 
that caveat in mind, one might say that Kaplow and Shavell’s proof 
is “dead as a dodo”—the proof does not have “live” significance 
for the fairness-versus-welfare debate. There is, of course, another 
sense in which the possibility problem is no problem at all for Kap-
low and Shavell: to the extent that their modal claim is about logi-
cal possibility, the proof is valid but uninteresting. 
F. The Misdescription of Deontology 
Kaplow and Shavell make a subtle but important assumption 
about the nature of deontological or fairness-based principles. 
Kaplow and Shavell assume that the world is divided between two 
sorts of theories, welfarist theories that evaluate possible worlds in 
terms of individual utility information considered anonymously, 
and nonwelfarist theories that evaluate possible worlds by consid-
ering information other than individual utility information. This as-
sumption is either incorrect or misleading. 
Consider the set of normative theories that we call deontologi-
cal. Deontological theories operate on the basis of moral rules such 
as “do not break your promises,” “do not kill innocent persons,” 
and so forth. That is, deontological theories impose constraints on 
actions or omissions by agents. Nonwelfarist social-evaluation 
functions operate on possible worlds and not on actions. A nonwel-
farist social-evaluation function might result in the following judg-
ment: “A possible world in which a promise is broken should re-
ceive negative ten evaluation points as compared to a possible 
world that is otherwise identical, but in which the promise is kept.” 
Deontological theories do not fit the mold of nonwelfarist 
evaluation functions. Nonwelfarist evaluation functions operate on 
possible worlds. They look at the consequences of actions from an 
impartial point of view, and hence they are ill-equipped for the 
task of constraining agents. Deontological theories look at actions 
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from the point of view of an agent or actor, and hence they are ill-
equipped for the task of evaluating possible worlds. 
In other words, Kaplow and Shavell are comparing apples and 
oranges. They are attempting to compare an approach to evaluat-
ing possible worlds with an approach to evaluating actions. These 
two different kinds of theories answer different kinds of questions. 
To compare them directly is to commit a category mistake, an 
egregious conceptual error. 
There is, however, a way to compare welfarism with deontologi-
cal theories. A theory that evaluates possible worlds can be com-
pared to a theory that evaluates actions by a simple process of con-
ceptual transmogrification. Thus, we can transform any particular 
theory encompassed by welfarism into a theory of action. For ex-
ample, act-utilitarianism is the theory that says one should choose 
the action that will produce the greatest level of utility, as com-
pared to the available alternative courses of action. For Kaplow 
and Shavell, the greatest level of utility could be operationalized as 
the classical utilitarian social-welfare function. 
As demonstrated above, however, Kaplow and Shavell do not 
choose this route to creating comparability between welfarist con-
sequentialism and deontology. They are explicit in stating that wel-
farism is a theory for analysts and not for policymakers. Rather 
than transform a theory that evaluates possible worlds into a the-
ory that evaluates actions, they attempt the reverse—transforming 
a deontological theory into a theory for the evaluation of possible 
worlds. Kaplow and Shavell fail, however, to see that this trans-
formation distorts deontology. “Killing of innocents is forbidden” 
does not mean the same thing as “a possible world in which killing 
of innocents happens rates ten points lower than a possible world 
in which killing of innocents does not happen, ceteris paribus.” By 
forcing deontological theories into a consequentialist straight-
jacket, Kaplow and Shavell distort the theories’ essential meaning. 
Kaplow and Shavell now have some fancy footwork to do. They 
might try casting their version of welfarism as a theory of policy-
making. Then, they could argue that welfarist approaches to poli-
cymaking cannot violate weak Pareto in the sense that such ap-
proaches cannot lead to a choice that makes everyone worse off. 
Kaplow and Shavell then would conclude that deontological ap-
proaches to policymaking could violate weak Pareto, leading to a 
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policy choice that does make everyone worse off. At that point, 
however, Kaplow and Shavell will run into a brick wall. They can-
not prove that every conceivable deontological theory of policy-
making can violate weak Pareto, as is easily established by the fol-
lowing example. Imagine the following, highly simplified, 
deontological theory of policymaking: 
Make policy in accord with the following triplet of lexically or-
dered rules: 
(1) Never make a policy that will result in making everyone 
worse off. 
(2) If (1) is satisfied, select that policy that will maximize the 
sphere of equal and adequate liberties guaranteed to each indi-
vidual. 
(3) If (1) and (2) are satisfied, select the policy that will produce 
the best consequences. 
Conformity to this theory guarantees zero tolerance for weak 
Pareto violations because avoidance of such violations is built into 
the first principle. 
Howard Chang made a very similar criticism of Kaplow and 
Shavell,63 and their reply to him64 works only if they are allowed to 
redescribe deontology as consequentialism. Of course, Kaplow and 
Shavell can claim that they never intended to compare welfarism 
with fairness theories. They can say that their argument is only in-
tended to compare theories for the evaluation of possible worlds 
and is not intended to cast doubt on deontological theories such as 
Kant’s. This move would, however, open them to the charge that 
they are arguing against a straw man. Moreover, it would not save 
their proof, because, as I have demonstrated, one can construct a 
nonwelfarist theory of evaluating possible worlds that does not vio-
late weak Pareto. 
Kaplow and Shavell’s misdescription of deontology is a very se-
rious conceptual flaw in their defense of welfarism. This misde-
63 Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the 
Pareto Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 173, 214–15 (2000). 
64 Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness, supra note 2, at 240–41 (describing fair-
ness in terms of giving weight rather than as a deontological system of rules). 
SOLUM_BOOK 10/22/2006 3:51 PM 
2006] Public Legal Reason 1499 
scription reflects a category mistake at the core of their thinking, 
and correction of that mistake would require them to give up the 
claim that their proof is relevant to the fairness-versus-welfare de-
bate—insofar as that debate is about live positions in normative le-
gal theory (as opposed to hypothetical positions that Kaplow and 
Shavell have themselves created). 
G. The Preference Assumption 
The final difficulty with Kaplow and Shavell’s argument lies in 
an assumption they make about preferences. This assumption is 
well hidden in their proof, and it will take some explication to bring 
it out. In their own statement of their proof, they state: “If F is not 
an individualistic social welfare function, we know from the obser-
vation that there exist x, x’ ∈  X such that Ui(x) = Ui(x’) for all i and 
F(x) ≠ F(x’).”65
In other words, Kaplow and Shavell are assuming that on the ba-
sis of some fairness (nonwelfarist) consideration, one possible 
world is rated higher than another, but every individual is indiffer-
ent between the two worlds. The hidden assumption is that no one 
cares about the fairness (nonwelfarist) consideration. This point 
bears repetition: Kaplow and Shavell’s proof assumes that no one 
in the whole universe prefers the fair possible world to the unfair 
possible world. 
This assumption is crucial, and Kaplow and Shavell cannot re-
formulate the proof to work around it. If even one person cares 
more about fairness than about the imaginary good introduced in 
their proof, then it cannot be the case that the fairness (nonwelfa-
rist) theory leads to a violation of weak Pareto. The one person 
who cares more about fairness than the hypothetical consumer 
good would be better off in the world where fairness is respected. 
And if even one person prefers fairness to welfare, ranking the fair 
world as preferable to the unfair world does not violate weak 
Pareto. 
Kaplow and Shavell would likely concede this point. They see it 
as a virtue of their view that it allows fairness to be incorporated, 
but only to the extent that persons have a taste for fairness. But 
when the point is considered from a first-person perspective, the 
 
65 Kaplow & Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method, supra note 2, at 284. 
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hidden assumption that no one cares about fairness begins to look 
like a vice rather than a virtue. Moral theories are theories about 
what preferences one ought to have. What should I value more 
highly, fairness in punishment or an extra share of some consumer 
good? Some moral theories may be neutral on this question, but 
others are not. Some moral theories say that we ought to care more 
about fundamental fairness than about consumption of nonessen-
tial items. 
If you are reasoning about which moral theory you should adopt 
and hence which preferences you ought to adopt, how would you 
react to Kaplow and Shavell’s argument, given the hidden assump-
tion? Kaplow and Shavell tell you that if you reject a theory that 
would lead one to value fairness more than welfare, then the theory 
you reject might lead to the conclusion that we ought to make eve-
ryone worse off. However, if you do decide to value fairness more 
than welfare, then the theory you adopt cannot lead to the conclu-
sion that we ought to make everyone worse off—because at least 
one person, you, will prefer that we do justice rather than that we 
give everyone a little more of some consumer good. In other 
words, from the first-person perspective, Kaplow and Shavell’s ar-
gument is question begging. As Kaplow and Shavell elegantly put 
it, each of us must judge the case of fairness versus welfare. It is no 
argument at all to claim, as they do, that if everyone has already 
decided in favor of welfare, then it would make everyone worse off 
to decide in favor of fairness. This is a deep problem with Kaplow 
and Shavell’s argument; once the problem is exposed, it becomes 
clear that their proof is utterly irrelevant to the fairness-versus-
welfare debate. 
CONCLUSIONS: WELFARE AND FAIRNESS AS PUBLIC LEGAL 
REASONS 
I now return to my central claim: normative legal practice should 
employ the resources of “public legal reason,” understood as legal 
reasons that are accessible by all reasonable citizens. For the pur-
poses of this Essay, I illustrated the flip side of that claim by dis-
cussing a particular theory, welfarism, and a particular argument 
for welfarism, Kaplow and Shavell’s “proof.” But the critical impli-
cations of the argument for public legal reason are not limited to 
Kaplow and Shavell, welfarism, or even consequentialism in gen-
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eral. Any normative legal theory that claims to guide legal practice 
and relies on deep premises that are not accessible to reasonable 
citizens faces the same general problem—whether it be legal deon-
tology, law as integrity, or something else. Nonetheless, the exami-
nation of Kaplow and Shavell has exemplary significance because 
the totalitarian ambitions of their project are so close to the sur-
face. 
Kaplow and Shavell chose to title their book Fairness versus 
Welfare. Some readers might suggest as a revised title “Philosophy 
versus Economics.” Both titles are mistakes because they suggest 
that the answer to the fundamental question of normative legal 
theory must be a deep theory—either deontology or welfarism or 
something else. But this does not dissolve the fundamental ques-
tion of normative legal theory: what moral theory should guide the 
study of law? The answer to that question is complex. When the 
study of law is limited to the background culture, including the le-
gal academic culture, the answer is that any normative legal theory 
is fair game, so far as public reason is concerned. 
But when legal theorists seek to advise policymakers, then nor-
mative legal theory is properly constrained by public legal reason. 
Under those circumstances, the deep premises of comprehensive 
moral and philosophical doctrines should be excluded from norma-
tive legal theory. This means that the deep premises of both deon-
tology and welfarism are properly excluded from the domain of 
practical normative legal theory. But the exclusion of deep prem-
ises is not the same as exclusion tout court. Both deontology and 
welfarism can offer public legal reasons as counsel to lawyers, 
judges, and legislators. These public legal reasons are, of course, 
quite familiar to the contemporary legal academy—they are the 
reasons of policy and principle that are the bread and butter of 
midlevel legal theory. In this way, the ideal of public legal reason 
supports both welfare and fairness, but denies the claim of either to 
exclude the other. 
Law’s justifications should rely on normative principles that are 
accessible to reasonable citizens, whether they are theists or athe-
ists, deontologists or consequentialists, moral philosophers or 
economists. Law’s deliberations should be shallow and not deep. 
Law’s reason should be public. 
